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LEGAL NOTES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT

authorities were not such agencies, within the purview of R. S. 40:17-9, whose officers "whether
elective or appointive, shall immediately cease and
determine" upon the change in form of the city
government.
The court refused to accept any of these arguments, on the theory that local housing authorities
were engaged in a purely local municipal function
and that the statute enabling the creation of a
local housing authority defined it as "an agency
and instrumentality of the municipality or county
creating it." The court further held that the various provisions of the Local Housing Authorities
Law, which in substance persuade that local housing authorities were intended to be endowed with
independence and continuity, were not inconsistencies which would prevail over the Walsh Act, under
the provision of the Local Housing Authorities
Law that the latter law shall prevail over any inconsistent laws. The reason given by the court
was that the Walsh Act speaks from the date of
"immediately after the election and organization
of the commissioners" providing that laws inconsistent with it "shall be repealed and abrogated",
whereas the Local Housing Authorities Law speaks
from the date of its enactment.
The net result of this decision is that the corporate entity remains undisturbed, but the offices of
commissioners of local housing authorities "cease
and determine" upon a change of municipal form
of government under the Walsh Act.
A taxpayer in the City of Scranton sought to
restrain the Scranton Housing Authority from proceeding with its program because one of the original
members of the Scranton Housing Authority was
ineligible to office because of non-residence in the
City of Scranton. Before the suit was brought, the
ineligible member had resigned. The court dismissed the bill because it found that its only point,
that "the appointment of the Authority as a group
was invalid because of the ineligibility of one of
the members, . . . would lead to an absurd result

in the conduct of public business." Hartman v.
City of Scranton, Common Pleas, Lackawanna Co.,
June 15, 1940.
In a third Montana housing decision, State ex
rel. Great Falls Housing Authority v. City of Great
Falls, 100 P. (2d) 915 (Mont., March 19, 1940,
reh. den. Apr. 2, 1940), the Cooperation Agreement between the City and the Housing Authority,
upon which the Local Authority relies for the fulfillment of some of the requirements for eligibility
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for a loan from the USHA, was upheld and enforced by the Supreme Court. The Court held
that mandamus was the proper remedy to compel
the City Council to take the necessary steps to
vacate streets and zone certain lands; that after
the city officials, proceeding under the Housing
Law, exercised their discretion to empower the
Mayor to appoint commissioners to advance the
incorporation of the Housing Authority, appropriated money for overhead expense for the first year,
and did other acts of similar import, the general
municipal statutes ceased to have any further application and all things thereafter done or performed
in relation to the Housing Authority passed under
the exclusive control of the provisions of the Housing Authorities Law. Hence, the City Council,
having invoked the Housing Authorities Law by
creating the Housing Authority, is required to comply with the Act insofar as cooperation is required.
"This is in effect the mandate the Legislature addressed to all cities of the state which elect to
create a housing authority within their jurisdiction."
With the constitutionality of state housing laws
upheld without exception in all jurisdictions where
the question has come before the courts, it may
be said that the legality of the local low-cost housing and slum clearance programs, integrated to the
United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended, is
firmly established. The development of the new
body of law relating to public housing is now entering a second phase, that of definition of the various
contractual and financial powers of local authorities, their rights and liabilities, and place in the
governmental structure. The Trenton and Great
Falls cases point to such further development.
HERMAN D. HILLMAN

LOCAL TAXATION
(a) Relation of municipal corporations to
other sovereign bodies with reference to the
taxing powers.
THE familiar rule that municipalities have no taxing powers except by delegation from the
state, which may limit such powers as it pleases,
was applied by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in Board of Assessors v. Cunningham Foundation, 26 N. E. (2d) 335. Also, a
municipal taxing power may be limited so as not
to interfere with state taxation. This is actually
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done in Pennsylvania, as is shown by the decision
of the Supreme Court of that state in Philadelphia
v. Samuels, 12 Atl. (2d) 79.
Furthermore, municipal corporations may be
made subject to state taxation even with respect
to their governmental functions, unless expressly
exempted by the state constitution. This was the
decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama, in
County Board of Education v. State, 194 So. 881,
holding that a local board of education was subject
to the state tax on gasoline, though it was used in
school buses for transporting children. The court
even held that the Board was subject to the statutory penalties for failing to pay the tax on time,
and that the judiciary had no authority to remit
such penalties. It was pointed out, however, that
the statute gave the State Tax Commission the
power to remit the penalties if it deemed it proper
to do so.
In Biloxi v. Gully, 193 So. 786, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi was confronted with a peculiar situation, which led the court to apparently
give the city some rights against the state. This
decision, however, seems entirely justified, since
the rights claimed and allowed were against a state
officer acting fraudulently rather than against the
state itself. The situation was that the city was
claiming against its county, under a statute, for
one-half taxes due from city property for county
road purposes. The county was not resisting the
claim, but merely requiring a careful audit. While
this was going on, the defendant, the state tax collector, sued the county in behalf of the city for
the amount alleged to be due. The city, asserting
that he brought this suit merely to collect his
20% statutory fee, sought to intervene in the state
tax collector's suit. The court held that there
could not be a technical intervention, but that
the city had a standing to show that the state tax
collector was not acting in good faith, and to be
entitled itself to prosecute the suit, or otherwise
settle the controversy.
In Pettibone v. Cook County, 31 Fed. Supp. 881,
a decision of the U. S. District Court of Minnesota, the extraordinary situation arose of an attempt by a Minnesota county to tax lands not
situated in Minnesota, or even in the United States,
but in Canada. The reason for this was the uncertainty of the international boundary line at this
point. The case will be considered more at length
hereafter, but it may be noted here that the court
decided that such an exaction could not be regarded

as a tax at all. The geographical limitation of the
sovereign's power to tax is even more rigid as between international sovereignties than as between
the states of this country.
(b) Property Taxes-Exemptions.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, in Gundry v.
R. B. Smith Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 291 N. W.
213, held that tax exemptions as to charities were
to be more strictly construed than the exemption
from tort liability. Nevertheless, the court held
the hospital in question exempt from property
taxes, even though its practice was to impose a
charge upon all patients. However, the charge was
remitted, in whole or in part, whenever a patient
was unable to pay, and no patients were excluded
on financial grounds. The hospital usually lost
money, but in a few years had made a small net
income, all of which was used to purchase new
equipment. And no earnings were ever distributed.
The court held that the hospital was essentially
a charity.
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Board of Assessors v. Cunningham
Foundation, 26 N. E. (2d) 335, held property of
an association formed for the purpose of beautifying the town of Milton, exempt from all property
taxes. The property in question was laid out as
a park, and was open to the use of all inhabitants
of Milton, though an attempt was made to exclude
persons not residents of that town. The part of
this property in question was situated within the
boundaries of the adjoining city of Quincy. The
court held that Quincy had no authority to tax it,
even though it was not beneficial to the city itself
or its inhabitants, since it was held by a charitable corporation for public purposes, and was
therefore explicitly exempt under the state statutes.
It was conceded that such an exemption was probably not entirely fair under these circumstances,
but since it had been explicitly given by the state
legislature, the city of Quincy had no authority to
impose any tax.
A somewhat similar exemption, though without
any unfairness as between different municipal corporations, was enforced by the Supreme Court of
Illinois, in People ex rel Hellyer v. Morton, 25
N. E. (2d) 504. Here a trust was established to
carry out research in horticulture, arboriculture,
and the like. This research was for the information and benefit of the public, and was directed
toward both useful and ornamental vegetation.
The court held that this was a strictly charitable
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purpose for public benefit, and the grounds used
for this purpose were tax exempt.
In New Jersey, property of fraternal organizations is tax exempt, though this is not the rule
in many states. Assuming the soundness of this
rule (which was established by statute) no particular criticism can be made of the decision of the
State Board of Tax Appeals in Craftsmen's Club
v. Rahway, 11 Atl. (2d) 36. Here a holding company owned a building for the benefit of four
fraternal organizations, which used it exclusively,
and divided maintenance expenses. The court held
the building exempt from taxation on the ground
that in substance it was owned by the fraternal
organizations. Actually it was not a case of a
building being rented for profit to fraternal organizations, even though for purely technical legal purposes the transaction took this form. But in New
Brunswick v. Delta Phi Fraternity, 11 Atl. (2d)
430, the Board intimated that this exemption of
fraternal organizations did not apply to college
fraternity property.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, in
Y.M.C.A. v. Philadelphia, 11 Atl. (2d) 529, that a
Y.M.C.A was not subject to the Philadelphia sales
tax. While this is not strictly a property tax question, the case is interesting in this connection, since
the same court had previously ruled that Y.M.C.A.
property is subject to taxation. In this case, the
court held that the two statutes are distinguishable in that the property tax exemption is stated in
more rigid terms, under which the Y.M.C.A. had
been held not to fall.
An interesting problem with respect to tax exemptions was presented in the decision of New
York Court of Appeals, in Bush Termind Co. v.
City of New York, 26 N. E. (2d) 269. This was
a taxpayer's action to enjoin the city from entering
into a contract with the Port of New York Authority, for the payment of the city by the Authority,
in lieu of taxes, of an amount equal to the taxes
payable on buildings demolished to erect a freight
terminal building by the Authority. This amount
would concededly be much less than the taxes
would be on the building if privately owned. The
building is to be sixteen stories high, but only the
basement and a part of the first floor will be used
as a freight terminal; the rest will be rented for
private purposes. However, it is necessary to
erect such a large building in order to economically
use the land, which is situated in down-town New
York. The contract was authorized by an express
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statute of the New York legislature, the New Jersey
legislature having passed a similar statute. The
Authority was formed by a compact between New
York and New Jersey, which defined it as "the
municipal corporate instrumentality of the two
states" for developing New York harbor, etc.
The court dismissed the action. Under the circumstances already stated, the erection of this
large building was held not ultra vires of the
Authority. If the property is exempt from taxation, the plaintiff obviously has no standing, since
the only result of the contract will be that the
city will get more than it otherwise would. And
the building was held to be exempt from taxation.
The court expressed some doubt whether it was
exempt as property of a municipal corporation,
especially as the legislature may not have intended
to exempt all property of the Authority At any
rate, the court held that a statutory authorization
to enter into a contract for payments in lieu of
taxes amounted to an implied exemption from taxation, at least if such a contract is actually entered into. The validity of this exemption is clear,
since the Authority is obviously a public instrumentality, and operates for the public benefit.
The New Jersey State Board of Tax Appeals
gave a very rigid-possibly too rigid-construction
of the educational exemption of that state, in College of Paterson v. Paterson, 11 Atl. (2d) 320,
holding that personal property of a non-profit educational organization is not exempt from taxation
when the organization rents the building occupied
by it, and does not own it. There can be no doubt
that the building, which was rented by its owner
for profit, is itself not tax-exempt. The Board
held that the personal property was not exempt
because of two provisions in the statute. One of
these was that the exemption is limited to cases
"where the association . . . owns the property in

question." The Board said that the college did
not own "the property," because it did not own the
building; but it could be answered that the college
did own the property in question, viz. the personal
property. Another provision of the statute denies
the exemption when the buildings are conducted
for profit. As already said, this is clearly sound
as affecting the building; but again the court
seems to disregard the fact that it is only the personal property which is involved, and that is
owned by the college.
Los Angeles County v. Craig, 100 Pac. (2d) 818,
a decision of the District Court of Appeals of Cali-
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fornia, considers the exemption from property taxation given by the constitution of that state to vessels. The exemption was contested as regards this
particular ship on two grounds. One was that the
statute required the ship to be "registered" at a
California port, and this ship was only enrolled.
The court held this immaterial, since it stated that
the term "registered" was not used technically but
in its popular sense, especially as the term was used
in the state constitution. The purpose obviously
was to assist the shipping industry, and this purpose should be given effect by including in the
exemption any vessel registered, enrolled, or licensed in California. The other objection was that
the vessel was not being used during part of the
years in question, and therefore it was contended
that it did not comply with the constitutional provision that it should be "engaged in the transportation of freight or passengers." The reason it
was not being used was that such use was temporarily unprofitable; and it was kept ready for use
and was put into service as soon as it was profitable to do so. The court held that merely temporary cessation of use for purposes of repairs or
any other proper purposes did not take away the
exemption. The ship was therefore held exempt
from taxation.
ROBERT

C. BROWN

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS
A. Powers and Duties of School Boards
The right of a school board to act with a reasonable exercise of discretion, and to be free from
control by a mandamus proceeding in the absence
of illegal or arbitrary action, has been affirmed in
two recent cases. State ex rel. Cedar Creek School
Tp. v. Curtin, 26 N. E. (2d) 909 (Ind., April 30,
1940); State v. Reagan, 136 S. W. (2d) 521
(Tenn., Feb. 17, 1940), where the court refused to
compel a board of education to employ a teacher,
where there was no showing of arbitrary action by
the board.
In Walker v. School Dist. of City of Scianton,
12 Atl. (2d) 46 (Pa., March 25, 1940), a statute
provided that "Whenever it shall become necessary
to decrease the number of professional employes
by reason of substantial decrease of pupil population within the school district, the board of school
directors-may suspend the necessary number of
professional employes, but only in the inverse order

of the appointment of such employes. . .

."

It

was held that the board of education has the power
to suspend teachers in inverse order of their appointment in a particular classification without
regard to other appointments in other classifications or subjects taught.
In Jensen v. Special School Dist., 136 S. W. (2d)
169 (Ark., Jan. 29, 1940), the court considered a
school district's power to borrow money. The
court held that where a statute confers power on a
school district to borrow money but does not fix
or limit the rate of interest that must be paid the
district is not authorized to contract for payment
of interest except in the legal amount of 6% per
annum. The power to borrow money conferred on
a school district carries with it the power to issue
evidence of indebtedness therefor and to pay interest thereon. It was also held that the statutory
power of a school district to borrow money from
banks and individuals with fixed limitations is not
repealed by a statute limiting the expenditure of a
school board to the amount of the revenue for a
school year unless the statute is specifically repealed. Repeal of statutory power by implication
is not favored.
The duty of a Board of Education in selling
school property was defined in Weaks v. Bd. of Ed.,
137 S. W. (2d) 1094 (Ky., Feb. 27, 1940). The
court held that in the absence of a statute of limitations, the action of the Board in selling must
necessarily be consonant with the duties imposed
on them by law to keep and maintain an adequate
school system within the limits of their finances.
Any action by the Board of Education which imperils the entire school system or a material portion thereof, is necessarily an action which may be
called in question by the courts because of public
policy.
In Berry v. Arnold School Dist., 137 S. W. (2d)
256 (Ark., Feb. 26, 1940), the court emphasized
the duty of a school board to keep schools in operation with competent teachers. The mere employment of teachers, and keeping them at a school
house where pupils attend is not sufficient. The
school board's duty extends to the selection of
suitable persons as teachers, and also to see that
the school is maintained and adapted to the intellectual and moral advancement of the pupils.
The right of a Board of Education to sue in its
own name was considered in Bd. of Ed. of Baker
Co. v. Hall, 7 S. E. (2d) 183 (Ga., Feb. 13, 1940),
where the court pointed out that an action cannot

